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Introduction
Critiques and attempted reforms of EU programme
management are based on the unremarkable assumption
that there is something wrong and it needs to be put right.
Writing in 1992, Sutherland speculated on whether the
EC’s increased legal competences were matched by its
managerial capacities, and concluded that “given the
pace of recent changes there is an a priori case for
suggesting that the EC has a management deficit”.2 Its
substance was a shortage of relevant management skills
in the Commission and in the coordinating mechanisms
beyond.
The lack of management capability has also been
regularly documented in the annual reports of the European
Court of Auditors (ECA), which have been highly critical
of the Commission’s own financial management and its
seeming inability to make much impression on poor
management in the Member States. Others have pointed
to a loss of capability, directly attributable to the adverse
impact of subsidiarity on the Commission’s powers which
has leached away at the direct implementation and control
functions of the Commission in favour of the Member
States (e.g. Kok3 and ECA annual reports, 1987 and
1989). It is argued that direct beneficiaries have acquired
responsibilities previously in the hands of the Commission
for managing their own performance and checking whether
they are spending EU receipts in accordance with the
criteria laid down in the regulations.
It was Metcalfe4 who first coined the term
“management deficit” and posed the question of whether
the Commission in particular could “manage Europe”.
Characterising the Commission as a centralising
bureaucracy which nevertheless did not have exclusive
responsibility for managing EU policies, he focussed
attention on the need to establish performance indicators,
to improve coordination, information systems and
strategic management capabilities, and most importantly,
to create administrative networks in the Member States.
In this case, the solutions invited are those which
concentrate on network creation and the improvement of
managerial skills in the main.
But this model of the management deficit is not the
only show in town. There are other managerialist
approaches (such as the Commission’s SEM 2000 and
MAP 2000 programmes) which have their own priorities,
and there are agenda which are driven by different motors
altogether: the legal framework (e.g. the need for European
criminal code with EU powers to match), the policy
environment (reform of the CAP, the structural funds
etc.), economic reform (the single market and EMU),
structural reform of the institutions (the democratic deficit,
accountability etc.), and “renationalisation” of EU policies
(subsidiarity). Thus the debate about the quality of EU
programme management is one in which many problems
are identified, much diagnosis is made and many solutions
suggested. There are nevertheless some common
assumptions, not all of which are compatible one with
another:
(1) Fraud and corruption are widespread
(2) Management capabilities in the Commission are
generally poor
(3) Bad policy design is responsible for uncontrolled
budgetary growth
(4) Management capabilities in the Member States are
generally poor and Member States don’t take the
management of EU funds sufficiently seriously
(5) There is too much interference by Brussels in member
state supervision
(6) The Commission lacks the necessary legal powers
to manage effectively
(7) There is a lack of cooperation and coordination
between Member States and the Commission
(8) Management resources have not kept pace with
budgetary growth
Be they perceptive, polemical or simply idiotic, the
problem is that none of these assertions have any
foundation in systematic empirical investigation. Indeed,
some of them are inherently unfalsifiable, yet are still
important influences on the evolution of the practice of
programme management. On the substance, there is little
consensus and only limited knowledge.
We only need extemporise on the basic questions to
illustrate this: what is it that needs fixing – is it financial
management practices, project management skills,
evaluation capacities, structural/ institutional design,
legislative impediments, network deficiencies, personnel
policy, policy making instruments, or a combination of
all or some of these?; how much does it need fixing – is
it simply a question of more resources, a few new
regulations, more training and a new “culture”, or is it a
wholesale change to everything?; for how long has
programme management needed to be fixed – the last 5
years, 10 years, 20 years?; are the (undefined) problems
about the same, becoming more severe or ameliorating,
and if so, by how much?; who or what is responsible– is
it the Treaties, the Council of Ministers, the Commission,
the Member States, organised crime, the Parliament,
people in general, original sin?; at which level or levels of
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implementation are the difficulties most severe – local,
national, supranational?; what are the most effective
strategies for improvement – legislation, staff
development, partnership, centralisation, decentralisation,
automation, revolution?
Yet the substance of our knowledge is potentially
rich. There is a wealth of information available (admittedly
partial, inconsistent and varied) on EU programme
management performance in evaluation reports, ECA
reports, Commission reports, national audit reports etc.
but it is underutilised, unsystematised, discounted and
ignored. There are many snapshots but no movie; indeed,
there is not even a coherent screenplay. In practice,
mythology rules, and stories about cases of fraud and
mismanagement tend to be more influential than the rich
humus which is available for serious investigation and
study. The recent spat between the Commission and the
Parliament over “whistle blowing” by a Commission
official on alleged fraud and cronyism is only the most
recent example of this phenomenon.
The need for a systematic approach
There is no reason for this state of affairs to continue. By
asking a few simple preliminary questions questions (see
above), devising a research design, defining a few concepts
and applying some standard investigative techniques, we
can construct both a profile of EU programme
management and a strategy for improving it.
a) Conceptual framework
Terms such as “implementation” and “management” not
to mention “programme management”, need some precise
formulation. In one sense, it is easier to specify what is
excluded rather than included. We are not concerned with
the implementation and interpretation of EU directives
by Member States in programme areas outside the major
spending areas. Nor are we concerned with decision
making at the level of “high politics” within the Council
of Ministers system, including decisions on overall budget
size. The allocation of resources within the overall budget
and the budget making process are of no interest either, as
the first is essentially a matter of high policy, while the
latter is a constitutional process which must take place for
budgetary approval purposes. The annual budgetary
discharge decisions taken by the European Parliament
are of interest as a commentary on the state of programme
management and as an input on the conduct of programme
management in the future. Discharge decisions are
prescriptive. They can be seen as pieces of management
consultancy on which the recipients are obliged to act.
What actions and behaviours constitute “programme
management”, and who is responsible for it? In earlier
work, we adumbrated a cyclical model of the EU
management and control process which can serve as a
useful starting point, although it is not entirely sufficient
for our current purposes. The model isolated generic
functions in the post-allocation (budget making) phase.
These include authorisation, administration, audit, and
review and evaluation, the first three of which are
essentially non-judgmental (positive) in nature, while
review and evaluation are normative activities. While it
is difficult to talk about a single management process in
the context of a multi-level, multi-agency system like the
EU, these basic functions can be identified within the
different levels of management which in theory link
together.
The authorisation function involves the process of
approval for competent bodies to access funds allocated
from within the budget programme headings. This
constitutes a fairly restricted range of activities. First,
there is the Commission’s role in transferring funds to
Member State agencies and other direct beneficaries
(such as research institutes, third country delegations,
contractors and consultants). Thus it will include the
drawing up of contracts and agreements, where the
regulations require them, for transfer to take place. Within
the current framework, final authorisation is in the hands
of the Financial Controller (DG 20) rather than individual
DGs. In programme areas where there are particularly
attenuated chains of management (such as in the ESF,
ERDF, EDF or EAGGF Guarantee), authorisation would
include the transfer of funds by national and local
programme managers to projects/direct beneficiaries.
The longer and more complex the chain, the more bodies
will be involved in fund transfer. This tends to vary
considerably between Member States depending on the
degree of political and administrative decentralisation
and deconcentration.
The administration function defines itself here as a
much wider concept because it includes all those activities
associated with actually running programmes and projects,
and delivering objectives. It encompasses the content of
operational management as it is commonly understood. –
i.e. some local planning functions, which could be very
significant where large projects are involved (this applies
especially in the cases of the ESF, ERDF and EDF), the
setting and monitoring of goals and targets, deploying
and coordinating resources, problem solving, the
collection and maintenance of records and information,
the establishment and operation of systems, and reporting
to line managers. Thus, it goes beyond “routine”
processing functions and does imply some organisational
development.
It will be readily apparent that these management
functions devolve at many levels and at many stages
within the implementation process. For example, once
the five yearly policy decisions are made on the structural
funds, planning and the setting of goals and targets
initially takes place between Member State bodies and
the Commission (DG16 mainly, but also includes DG5
and DG6). This process will be further iterated at member
state level between centralised managing bodies
(ministries, regional governments, agencies etc.),
Programme Management Committees and local project
managers. The same comments apply to all the other
“routine” management functions identified.
To summarise, it is by nature a continuous, and in
some aspects, an innovative and judgmental process; in
this context, the soubriquet “administration” is too opaque
and reactive. We prefer to use the term “operational
management” to differentiate from our earlier usage,
within which the specific managerial competences we16
have referred to can be identified in the data.
Audit is more precise in meaning, although the term
has come to have a much wider currency in recent years.
The growth of effectiveness audit has inevitably led
auditors to the consideration of policy goals. In our earlier
model, audit activities which fell into the positive quadrant
essentially referred to technical, legal and regularity
audit. Anything involving judgments about objectives,
impacts, outcomes etc. fell into the review and evaluation
category in the normative quadrant. This included
effectiveness/VFM/comprehensive auditing as well as
outright programme evaluation. This remains an important
distinction for the present study as these functions are
quite discrete and require different competences; however,
the presence or absence of audit outputs of all descriptions
is a major indicator of management quality in this study.
Defining management quality is an industry in itself,
an important metaphor because much of the work in this
field is commercial and diagnostic in nature. Prescriptive
systems such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and
BS5750/IS9000 are essentially tools for organisations
trying to achieve certain management standards. We do
not start out with any definition of management quality,
nor can such a definition be established in any absolute
sense by our methodology. It is not prescriptive, nor does
it aim to compare EU programme management with that
of any other organisation. It is analytical, seeking to
measure changes based on the accumulation of evidence
which has been identified and classified within a
predetermined framework.
The evidence can only show whether programme
management is improving or deteriorating, and in what
ways it is doing so. Thus, the concept of management
quality is used here in a purely relativistic sense, although
the findings point strongly towards certain repetitive
patterns, and the likelihood or otherwise of different
types of management reform succeeding.
b) Performance indicators
To return to our earlier metaphor – can we make a movie
out of the snapshots? If so, which ones should be used and
how, and if not what else might be needed? Having
defined the objects of study, the next step is to try and
identify relevant performance indicators of management
quality. Once this is done, methods have to be devised to
collect and measure relevant data. There is a caveat:
While performance indicators can be useful management
and accountability tools when carefully designed, and
deployed parsimoniously, they can equally be pressed
into service by organisations for smokescreen and
propaganda purposes.
Performance indicators as propaganda do not arise as
an issue here, as there is no standard “official” set of
performance indicators for the measurement of EU
programme management. On the other hand, there has
been considerable effort (particularly with regard to the
ERDF and the EDF), to devise evaluative frameworks to
measure programme impacts (perhaps in some measure
because of the perceived partiality of Member State/
beneficiary -sponsored evaluations), but there is no single
methodology as yet. Perhaps there never will be given the
variegated, context-specific nature of individual
programmes and projects. It is the activity and quality of
impact assessment which is of interest rather than the
impacts themselves.
In this context, we propose a set of performance
measures based on the four functions of programme
management – authorisation, operational management,
audit, and review and evaluation – outlined earlier. The
fundamental approach is to build up a quantified portfolio
of evidence on the quality of key management activities.
Based on our earlier definitions, we have identified eight
performance dimensions which together constitute the
sum of programme management performance as a whole.
The indicators are:
i) levels of budget utilisation by programme. Over- or
undershooting budgetary allocations can be seen as
an indicator of poor management ceteris paribus.
There is an assumption in the annual reports of the
ECA that the closer actual spending is to the initial
allocation, the better.
ii) the maintenance of programme and project
schedules, and evidence of delays. This indicator is
particularly important in the areas of structural
actions, the EDF and other co-operation aid, and
research and development projects, although some
“dips” in performance are inevitable at the start of a
new programme cycle. The key issue is whether
there is an overall change between one cycle and
another holding all other factors constant.
iii) the quality and coverage of management information
and information systems. The provision of adequate
management information for managers and auditors
can be judged from the extent of paper and electronic
records and routine paperwork within the member
state agencies and at the Commission. Comprehen-
sive and comprehensible accounts are an essential
part of any management information system, an
issue frequently remarked upon by the ECA.
iv) the level of controlling, checking and audit activity.
Evidence of poor control could include both a lack
of regular control activity and the existence of
poorly designed or ineffective controls.
v) the level of irregularity in procedures and payments.
Instances of irregularities in procedures show a lack
of consistency and legitimacy in procedure design
or a failure of the management system to enforce
procedures. Irregular payments are a sub-set of this
indicator.
vi) evidence of inter-agency coordination. The presence
or absence of cooperation is an indicator of the
efficacy of programme management. Examples
could include the sharing of information, the
harmonisation of systems, joint controls and audits
etc.
vii) the degree of planning and targetting. Absence of
planning goals and specific target setting means
failure in impact assessment and evaluation is also
likely.
viii) the degree of impact assessment and programme
evaluation. Evidence of these activities confirms
the existence of the feedback loop which runs through17
routine controls, checks and auditing into the next
round of decision making and programme (or project)
adjustment. Relevant to all levels.
As in the case of management quality, we do not claim
to make any absolute definitions of these indicators; they
are heuristic devices simply to record evidence relating to
performance standards over time.
c)  Sources of evidence
Ideally, sources of evidence should be regular,
comprehensive, predictable and independent. Practically
speaking, there is only a small number of sources which
satisfy these criteria. At the member state level, there is
undoubtedly a huge amount of information residing in
institutions such as national and local audit agencies, and
in consultancy reports for ministries, ministry evaluations
and so on, but the collection and systematisation of it
would present huge logistical problems. Moreover, with
the exception of the audit body reports, much of this
material would fail the independence tests. Even in the
case of national audit outputs, it has to be recognised that
they too are designed to fulfill national rather than EU
reporting objectives.
In the specific sectors at the European level, there are
for example the annual reports produced by the
Commission on the management of the structural funds
and on the agricultural situation. At a more general level,
there are the Commission’s annual reports on the
implementation of Community law published since 1984,
and the UCLAF’s Annual Report on the Fight Against
Fraud in the Community which has been produced since
1991. The former are important documents but are legal
rather than managerial in nature. There is useful material
in the UCLAF annual reports on the specifics of fraud and
measures taken to combat it, but the time series is short,
and the reports are not designed to be comprehensive
appraisals of programme management. As in the case of
the externally commissioned evaluations, a major
additional problem with all these sources is that they
emanate from the Commission, and are thus part of the
system we are trying to assess rather than tools to assess
it.
One organisation which does pass the independence
test is the ECA. The first annual report of the Court
specifically referred to its independent status, and,
significantly, that it was “clearly laid down in the Treaties
that the responsibility of the Court is not limited to the
examination of the legality and regularity of the accounts
which it audits... it extends to also making an assessment
of the financial management... (i.e.) the soundness of the
operations actually carried out... and whether the means
employed to do so were the best in the sense of being the
most economical and efficient” (ECA, 1978.). Thus, we
have an expectation that ECA outputs would include
many of the areas of management performance we are
interested in.
The most obvious sources of performance data are the
annual reports of the ECA and the replies of the institutions
(the Commission in particular), which have now built up
into an archive covering 20 years. The reports are regular
and the ECA is independent of the management of the
programmes it audits. The reports are not without their
problems as source materials however. For example, in
the context of the Court’s responsibility to ensure “la
bonne gestion financière” (which includes effectiveness),
the reports do not only comment on issues of operational
management. Quite frequently, they stray directly into
policy issues and make judgments about the wisdom or
otherwise of different measures.
d) Quantifying the evidence
The next issue is how to analyse the information contained
in the annual reports. The general approach is to use
content analysis to identify statements which relate to the
eight quality indicators elaborated earlier. This provides
a disciplined means of analysing and quantifying
discourse. Statements relating to the quality indicators
are extracted, quantified and grouped into the categories
of “improvements”, “new problems and deterioration”,
“recurrent problems” and “actions required” for each
programme area over time This matrix is intended to
focus on the endemic weaknesses in the system and to see
whether the situation is improving or deteriorating.
In the case of the Commission replies, the category of
“actions required” is replaced by a category of “specific
disagreements with the Court”. The reasoning here is
based on the observation that the Court describes and
prescribes (for both the Commission and the Member
States), while the Commission responds and occasionally
disagrees. The analysis does not specifically identify
where the Commission simply agrees with the Court or
elaborates at length on a problem which the Court has
identified, as discourse of this kind constitutes the
overwhelming content of Commission replies.
e) Intervening variables
The raw data must be modified to take account of
intervening variables which affect the amount and quality
of ECA judgments. These include growth in budget size
adjusted for inflation, the enlargement of the EU from 9
to 15 members, changes in the numbers of officials and
auditors, and changes in their productivity.
The enlargement issue is directly related to budget
size. In numbers of members, the EU has grown by two
thirds, but in population terms it has increased by roughly
35% (from about 270 million to 370 million). On this
measure, we would expect a growth in real spending of
about a third ceteris paribus over the 20 year period. In
fact, both nominal and real spending have grown at a far
greater rate, with the overall figures showing a huge
nominal increase of around 700% (8 fold increase), and
a real increase (adjusted for inflation) in the order of
200% (3 fold increase). While some of the largest increases
do take place in the year following the accession of new
Member States (1982 (Greece), 1986 (Spain and Portugal),
and 1996 (Austria, Sweden and Finland)), there are some
very large increases in other years too (1978, 1988, and
1991 for example). It is notable that the real figures
fluctuate quite sharply, with decreases in some years
followed by huge increases in others (all figures from
ECA annual reports, 1978-97).18
To assess overall numbers of managers would mean
trying to quantify both at the level of the Commission and
the member state implementing bodies, in the latter case
separating out those involved exclusively in EU
programme management from national programmes.
While this may be easier to do in some areas (for example
in EAGGF guarantee), than others where programmes
are jointly funded and based on limited life projects (the
structural funds most notably), it is always very difficult.
On the other hand, figures for the numbers and types of
Commission employees are available, and these
individuals only work on EU programmes. In the absence
of other data, changes in total employment in the
Commission can be used as a single controlling surrogate
variable for changes in management resources as a whole.
Between 1977 and 1997, the total number of posts in
the Commission increased from 8,250 to 16,789, a rise of
104% . In crude terms, this represents a just over doubling
in the size of the Commission compared to a three fold
increase in the size of the budget. Unlike changes in the
budget figures, the rate of change is relatively even with
the exception of one or two years. Thus there is no direct
correlation between the rate of increase in the budget and
the rate of increase in the size of the Commission,
although increases in staffing do tend to be higher in those
years when budget growth is greater. However, this is not
always the case (1991 for example). If the figures are
broken down further into the changes in A class (Assistant
Administrator and above) officials only, a slightly different
picture emerges. Here, the numbers rose from 2,165 posts
in 1977 to 5,416 posts in 1997, an increase of 150% (2.5
times) over the period. While this does still not match the
rate of budget growth, it is a significantly greater increment
than the change in overall numbers.
As for changes in the productivity of those officials,
statistics at the level of detail we would prefer are not
available, but there are figures which differentiate between
the manufacturing and service sectors of the European
economy. Productivity figures for the services sector
within the EU as a whole for the period 1975-94 show an
annual average rise of 1.2% in the value added per person
employed (European Commission, 1997, 17, Table 2).
Extrapolating this rate until 1997, this would amount to
a cumulative increase in output of 28.5% between 1977
and 1997. If this increment is added to changes in the
absolute numbers of total Commission and Commission
grade A employees, we get an adjusted increase of 162%
(over 2.5 times) for the former and 221% (over 3 times)
for the latter over the period. On this measure, the quantum
of management resources in the Commission at least kept
pace with the growth in the real budget. The extensive IT
revolution in progress in the Commission since 1993
underscores the case for such an adjustment.
The level of audit output may also vary because of
input factors. The number of ECA employees, including
those incorporated from the pre-existing Audit Board and
ECSC Audit Board rose from 164 to 505, an increase of
208% in the period 1977-97. On the basis of the budget
figures we have analysed, it would appear that even
without adjustment, ECA resources kept pace with budget
growth. As in the case of the Commission, some further
finessing may be desirable in order to differentiate between
those involved in audit and audit administration only and
other staff. In this case, the number of staff in the former
category amounted to 106 in 1977 and 293 in 1997, an
increase of 175% over the period and below the rate of
increase for the Court as a whole. If the figures are further
adjusted to take into account service sector productivity
gains, then the total number of ECA employees shows a
rise of 296% (almost 4 times), and audit and audit
administration staff a rise of 253% (over 3.5 times). This
evidence suggest that ECA resources have kept
comfortably ahead of both budget growth and management
resources in the Commission (all staffing data from the
Official Journal, L series 1978-97).
In the course of this preliminary analysis, we have
already challenged one of the commonly held assumptions
about EU programme management just by looking at
some of the existing data. At a very cursory glance, the
performance indicator measures are sure to provide a few
more surprises. Hopefully, someone will take notice
before embarking on yet another improvement initiative.
RÉSUMÉ
La qualité de la gestion de programme de l’Union
européenne fait souvent l’objet d’une intense spéculation
dans les médias et parmi les parties intéressées. Or, l’on
ne dispose que de peu d’indices empiriques et
systématiques pour éclairer le débat. Cet article suggère
une approche méthodologique reposant sur les concepts
de gestion de la performance et de mesure de la qualité,
et utilisant des indices quantitatifs. Après avoir posé le
cadre analytique et identifié les différentes sources
d’indices possibles, nous examinons un certain nombre
de variables indépendantes essentielles qui influent sur
l’analyse des données.
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